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The Texas ice storm of February 2021 did not just knock out the power for four million
people, it resuscitated a dormant debate over the wisdom of the state’s deregulated
market for electricity.  Should such a vital service should be entrusted so entirely to the
market?  Of course, calling Texas’ electric market “free” is something of a misnomer,
since it stemmed from carefully calibrated acts of government beginning with a 1999
law signed by then-governor George W. Bush.  Passed with little or no consideration of
climate change or extreme weather, this legislation set the stage for a wobbling polar
vortex twenty years later to throw a crippling and near-catastrophic monkey wrench into
the state’s chain of electric supply.
The questions now being raised about deregulation echo those percolating across late
nineteenth America as laissez faire laws and court decisions helped usher in an era of
rising economic inequality and con icts.  Transportation (railroad and streetcar) and
utility (water, sewer, gas and electric) companies enjoyed little competition across many
territories they served, what economists of the time termed “natural monopolies.”  They
were thus able to hike charges on trapped consumers with impunity.  A Progressive
economics then set about critiquing the private machinations behind their monopolies,
as cries of foul play also turned political.  Out of movements from the agriculturalist
Grangers to the urban Progressives and “sewer socialists,” the  rst public regulatory
commissions were born, and public ownership of utility companies also  ourished.  The
Texas Railroad Commission was a product of this era, and by 1920 some 38 states had
created public commissions to oversee electric rates.
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Texas’s electric companies remained a national exception, with only city-level oversight
until 1975.  That year, the state  nally set up a Public Utilities Commission to regulate
electric companies along with gas, communications, and cable television industries.  By
then, environmental oversight of these and other industries was peaking both in Texas
and in Washington, D.C.  But nationally and in other states leaders were also switching
gears to explore the deregulation of industries including railroads long regulated on the
public’s behalf.  The rationales ranged from concerns about private oligarchies (airlines)
to new inter-industry competitiveness (trucks versus trains) to a neoconservative revival
of faith in market freedom.  Beginning under a Democratic President, Jimmy Carter, the
 rst deregulation measures came in ground transportation, airlines, and natural gas.
 The Republican administration of Ronald Reagan then attacked government regulation
more broadly, sowing the seeds both nationally and in Texas for the return of full-blown
laissez-faire ideology.  As in the late nineteenth century, economic inequality grew in
tandem with wealth- and business-favoring policies, the deregulation of Texas’s
electricity industry among them.
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A  rst step came in 1992, when the U.S. Congress passed an act enabling Texas’s Public
Utilities Commission to deregulate wholesale electricity suppliers.   The deregulation of
the state’s retail electricity markets then  rst gained serious consideration under
Governor George W. Bush, Texas’ second Republican governor of the twentieth century,
after Republicans  nally gained a majority in the Texas Senate for the  rst time since
Reconstruction in 1996. 
Among the advocates of electricity deregulation were companies seeking entry into this
market, especially the outspoken and in uential Enron.  The arriviste Houston-based
energy broker had grown explosively over the 1980s into the 1990s out of a niche
created by the deregulation of natural gas, and now sought to move into the state’s
market for electricity supply.  Among the great advantages it and other newcomers
anticipated over Texas’ established electricity providers, the latter faced the considerable
“stranded costs” of two massive nuclear plants not yet paid off, which were also
expensive to run.  In a time when climate change was being framed as largely a global
and future concern, consumer advocates as well as some environmental groups also
embraced the idea of deregulation, to keep current electric monopolies from “getting
bailed out by the consumer to the tune of billions of dollars,” as Texas Citizen Action
staff director Julie Davis put it.  With additional choices, they hoped, consumers stood a
chance of paying less, as established utilities were forced by competitors to keep prices
low and  nd other ways to cover their bad investments.  But the incumbent electric
utility industry, a powerful force in Texas politics, insisted on some provision to help it
recover these stranded costs, as a condition for its support of any deregulatory
measure. 
The Enron Complex in downtown Houston. Source: Telwink on Flickr
All these interested groups hewed to certain assumptions about Texas’ weather that
went unspoken: that its seasonal rhythms were stable and well-known, and that surely
private suppliers would prepare for their anticipated extremes, so regulators didn’t have
to.   
After an initial Bush-backed effort that died in committee, a  rst deregulation bill, in
1998, allowed the incumbent producers to issue bonds to recover stranded costs, but
failed to placate many other political players.  A year later, deregulation had become a
thoroughly bipartisan endeavor, with bills introduced by Dallas Democrat Steve Wolens
in the House and Waco Republican David Sibley in the Senate, and with Governor Bush
also actively supporting.   The  nal bill, Senate Bill B 7, with 56 amendments, provided at
least a little “something for [almost] everyone.”  The big established utilities got the right
to issue bonds to pay off their nuclear plants, then gradually repay with income from
customers.  Environmentalists celebrated requirements to clean up power plants by
“groundbreaking” emissions cuts and to build out 2000 megawatts of renewable power
within the decade.  An Enron spokesperson, too, found it a “good bill,” even though
deregulation would arrive in 2002 rather than the 2001 it had advocated.   Consumer
advocates, however, asserted that true market rates would likely exceed the modest six
percent decline set by the bill itself, and found it asked “consumers…to take a pretty big
leap of faith.” A Houston Chronicle reporter agreed, relaying his “strong impression that
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Looking back from 2021, this bill effectively tied the hands of Texas’ regulatory agencies,
preventing them from pressuring preparations for more extreme weather, even if they
had been so inclined.  More than that, the privatized, fragmented, and largely opaque
market for electricity it set in motion may actually have disincentivized Texas’ electric
industry from anticipating events like February’s devastating ice storm.  Twenty years
on, confronted with a winter freeze made more extreme by planetary trends stoked by
fossil fuels, the disastrous travails of Texas’s thoroughly privatized electricity markets
have revealed new truths about what SB 7 accomplished.   The massive black-outs and
large-scale disruption, the exorbitant power bills, the over seventy deaths and thousands
of worsened ailments epitomize the market failure of Texas’s “freed” electricity industry. 
 Aside from those few who  nagled huge pro ts, Texans’ faith in the ultimate
magnanimity of the market has been betrayed.   To steer this and other markets toward
actually serving the interest of the Texas public rather than a monied few, more
government will be necessary.  That need is all the greater given the volatile weather
which climate change has already begun stirring up over Texas, which is just getting
started. 
For further reading, see:
Dyer, R.A. (“Jake”). “The History of Electric Deregulation in Texas.” Cities Aggregation
Power Project, 2008. http://tcaptx.com/downloads/HISTORY-OF-DEREGULATION.pdf.
Hartley, Peter R., Kenneth B. Medlock, and Olivera Jankovska. “Electricity Reform and
Retail Pricing in Texas.” Energy Economics 80 (May 2019): 1–11.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.12.024.
Posted March 5, 2021
More Climate in Context, IHS & Public History
DONATE
CONTACT
All content © 2010-present NOT EVEN PAST and the authors, unless otherwise noted
Sign up to receive the monthly Not Even Past newsletter
SUBSCRIBE
Your email address
FEATURES BOOKS TEACHING DIGITAL & FILM
BLOG IHS TEXAS SPOTLIGHT
ABOUT
